The Guns of Kabul
Ambassador Said T. Jawad
The New York Times
03/15/2003
Just over a year ago at the conference in Bonn
on organizing a post- Taliban government, the factions of Afghanistan
pledged "to withdraw all military units from Kabul."
A glance around this city, especially at night, reveals the
emptiness of those words. Clumps of armed Afghans in olive fatigues
loom up out of the darkness. Kalashnikovs slung over their shoulders,
they search, harass, shake down or wave on, at whim.
My country is at peace. And yet Kabul, once a
vibrant and sophisticated capital, is like an armed camp. It
is time to demilitarize our major cities.
For Afghans, who have seen horrors beyond human
imagination committed at the point of a gun, the unjustified
armed presence here and in the provinces is a terrifying sight.
In Kabul but also in the provinces, where the rule of gun should
have been mitigated by the presence of the International Security
Assistance Forces, the sight of the armed men is enough to deter
most Afghans from participating in rebuilding their country,
even as we move toward national elections in 2004 as called
for in the Bonn agreement.
These armed groups can turn Afghanistan once again
into a dangerous and explosive place, a menace to Afghans and
the international community. For the truth is this: Afghans
are a moderate people. But the violence of the militias opens
the door - as it did in 1992 - to fundamentalism and dictatorship
by pushing a desperate population to seek refuge in groups like
the Taliban.
Afghans are acutely aware of this danger. In my
work with President Hamid Karzai, I am constantly approached
by Afghans who are concerned about the persistent presence of
the militias. "My constituents didn't ask me for schools
or clinics," said one delegate to last summer's loya jirga,
the grand council that selected the president. "They wanted
the weapons collected. They wanted the warlords disarmed."
To fulfill this wish, President Karzai last month
unveiled a comprehensive disarmament, demilitarization, and
reintegration program, including job training and incentives
for men-at-arms to return to civilian life. But Afghans cannot
do this alone. We need the strong backing and unequivocal support
of the United States and other members of the international
community to bring about the withdrawal of the armed groups
from our cities that was solemnly pledged in Bonn.
Kabul should receive immediate attention, for
it is a special case. Provincial visitors and dignitaries in
their distinct local dress are subject to humiliation and browbeating
from armed men. They conclude that Kabul, the capital, is not
really theirs. They return home with their faith in the unparalleled
Afghan experiment in nation-building eroded.
But the problem holds in the provinces as well.
In many places, regional commanders who have usurped the trappings
of legitimacy hold the population hostage. The Afghans have
repudiated them, but their gunmen impose silence, while they
violate human rights and expand their hold on power and the
economy in their regions. Until these men are disarmed, the
Afghan people cannot invest themselves in the future of their
country.
The international community needs to help us to
move militias out of urban centers to barracks and confine them
there, and to put into effect President Karzai's disarmament,
demilitarization and reintegration program, which includes recruiting
a limited number of irregular fighters into the national army
and channeling the rest toward productive employment.
We can maintain order in the cities by means of
a national police force working closely with the International
Security Assistance Force in Kabul and the newly formed Provincial
Reconstruction Teams elsewhere. The United States should expand
the mandate of these teams to include some temporary role in
law enforcement.
The United States, the United Nations and leading
international groups have built up an impressive track record
in the disarmament and demobilization of local militias in other
countries. In Kosovo, a carefully developed if imperfectly run
program led to the surrender of tens of thousands of weapons,
the demobilization of the bulk of the Kosovo Liberation Army
resistance fighters, and the transformation of the rest into
a civil defense force that could at least be monitored. Meanwhile,
an international police force maintained order and helped train
graduates of the Kosovo police academy.
We want the international determination
that drove the Kosovo disarmament process to focus now on Afghanistan.
With the international community's assistance, we can ensure
peace and prosperity in our country.
